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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of economic integration when
countries dier in their social security systems, more specically in the degree of
funding of their pensions, and in the exibility in the retirement age. It then turns
to the impact of ageing, namely the decline in fertility and the increase in longevity,
on the welfare of these integrated countries.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that economic integration can have unpleasant implications for countries,
which are relatively less indebted than others. Whether the debt we have in mind is the
traditional sovereign debt or the debt that is implicit to unfunded pension schemes, allow-
ing for a free capital mobility lead to an outow from indebted countries to countries with
sounder public nances. This consideration justied the Maastricht Treaty guidelines of
the European Union: a decit of less than 3% and a debt to GDP ratio not exceeding
60%. It is interesting to observe that the Maastricht Treaty was unable to touch the other
less explicit forms of endebtment.
Besides endebtment, there are other national characteristics that have the same impli-
cations and that have not received the same attention. One of them concerns the more
or less exibility of the retirement decision. There are a wide variety of regulations con-
cerning the age of retirement across OECD countries1 and this leads to an important
range in the eective age of retirement. This has some implications for saving and capital
accumulation. The life cycle theory of saving is quite explicit: the later individuals retire,
the less they have to save. If someone wants and is allowed to work till the end of his life
he will need to save much less than someone who decides or is forced to retire at, let us
say age 55, which is frequent in countries such as France or Belgium.
In this paper we are interested in the role of two features of the retirement systems in
case of economic integration: whether it is funded or not and whether it implies exible
or mandatory early retirement age. Given that mandatory retirement is often associated
with pay as you go (hereafter, PAYG) systems we consider what happens when two
countries, one with PAYG and mandatory retirement age and one with fully funding and
exible retirement form an economic union2. We show that the question of who wins and
1See Fenge and Pestieau (2005).
2For recent evidence, see EC (2008) and OECD (2011).
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who loses is ambiguous, it will depend on the relative strength of those two features: the
amount of unfunded pensions and the rigidity of the retirement age.
Then we turn to the question of ageing, namely the consequences of declining fertility
and increasing longevity on the welfare of this economic union and of its member states.
To deal with these issues, we deliberately adopt a simple two-country setting with Cobb-
Douglas production and log linear utility functions. To better understand the incidence
of ageing on both capital accumulation and utilities we resort to numerical examples.
2 The basic model: autarky
We use the standard overlapping generation model. An individual belonging to generation
t lives two periods t and t + 1. The rst one has a unitary length, while the second has
a length `  1; where ` reects variable longevity. In the rst period, the individual
works and earns wt which is devoted to the rst-period consumption, ct, saving st and
pension contribution  . In the second period he works an amount of time zt+1  `  1
and earns zt+1wt+1. This earning plus the proceeds of saving Rt+1st and the PAYG
pension p nances second period consumption dt+1. Working zt+1 implies a monetary
disutility v (zt+1; `) where
@v
@`
< 0 reects the idea that an increase in longevity fosters
later retirement.
Denoting by u () the utility function, the problem of an individual of generation t is:
maxU = u (wt      st) + `u





where p = (1+n) and  is the time discount factor. (1+n) is the gross rate of population
growth and also the number of children per individual.
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The FOC's are simply:
v0zt+1 (zt+1; `) = wt+1









We will use simple forms for u () and v(): u (x) = lnx and v (x) = x2=2` where
 2]0; 1] is a preference parameter. One clearly sees that the disutility of working longer
is mitigated by an increase in longevity. We can now write the problem of the individual
as:
ln (wt      st) + ` ln
0@wt+1zt+1 +Rt+1st   z2t+12` + p
`
1A ; (2)
where p = (1 + n). The FOC with respect to zt+1 and st yield

















We now turn to the production side. We use a Cobb-Douglas production function





where the labor force is Nt = Lt+Lt 1zt = Lt 1 (1 + n+ zt). We distinguish Nt the labor
force and Lt the size of generation t. We assume that
Lt = Lt 1 (1 + n) :
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Total population at time t is
Lt + `Lt 1 = Lt 1 (1 + `+ n) :
Denoting Kt=Nt  kt and Yt=Nt  yt, we obtain the income per capita
yt = f (kt) = Ak

t
and the factor prices
Rt = f
0 (kt) = Ak 1t
wt = f (kt)  f 0(kt)kt = (1  )Akt
Resource constraint at time t implies
f (kt) = ct +
`dt
1 + n
+ (1 + n) kt+1
while the equilibrium conditions in the labor and capital markets are respectively
Nt = Lt 1 (1 + n+ zt)
Kt+1 = Ltst
We can now write the dynamic equation with perfect foresight
(1 + n+ zt+1) kt+1 = st (6)
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i.e.,












(1 + n) k1 t+1
A (1 + `)

or
2A(1 + `)(1 + n)kt+1   2`A2(1  )kt + 2(1 + n)k1 t+1 + (7)
2A2`(1 + `)(1  )k(1+)t+1 + `A2(1  )2k+1t+1 + 2A` = 0
Dierentiating totally Equation (7) taken in the steady state and assuming both stability
and unicity of k, namely 0 <
dkt+1
dkt










These three inequalities are standard. It is indeed well-known that a PAYG pension ()
depresses capital accumulation, that working longer () has a negative impact on saving
and that a lower fertility rate (n) increases the steady-state capital stock. However, the
eect of an increase in longevity on capital accumulation is ambiguous:
dk
d`
=  2A` 2(1 + n)k   2` 2(1 + n)k + 2A2(1  )k1+ ? 0 (8)
This inequality is more surprising and its ambiguity depends on the presence of a exible
age of retirement along with a PAYG system. Without pension and exible retirement,
increasing longevity unambiguously fosters capital accumulation.
It is important to note at this point that some of these results, particularly the unam-




Let us assume that we have two countries that are identical in all respects but in the
values of their preference for retirement () and the degree of prefunding of their pension
system. We denote these countries A and B. Country A has a PAYG pension system
with mandatory retirement at the end of the rst period. Country B has a fully funded
pension system with exible retirement age. Assuming that A = 0 is a statement on the
nature of preferences. However this has the same formal implications as having any value
of  but constraining z to be equal to 0. Henceforth in this paper to mean that early
retirement is mandatory, that is that people must retire at the end of the rst period
regardless of longevity, we posit that  is nil. Therefore, the consumer's preferences in
country A and B are as follows:






UB = ln(wB;t   sB;t) + ` ln





As long as the two countries are autarkic, their GDP and welfare will depend on their



























kA;t = kB;t = kt
When capital markets are integrated, the dierence in saving between both countries is








2A (1 + `)
k1+B;t+1 (13)
Clearly, if A is relatively higher than B, one expects to have a higher steady-state capital
stock and a higher GDP in B than in A. The equilibrium in the integrated capital market
is given by
Lt (sAt + sBt) = KA;t+1 +KB;t+1 (14)
or
sA;t + sB;t = 2kt+1 (1 + n) + kt+1zB;t+1 (15)
2 (1 + n) kt+1 + B`A (1  ) k1+t+1 =
2A`
1 + `
(1  ) kt  
B`A
2(1  )2




  A(1 + n)
A(1 + `)
k1 t+1 : (16)
From Equation (16), one obtains kt+1 and then one is able to calculate the ow of capital
from one country to the other. The ow of capital from country A to country B is given
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by:
MAB = (1 + n)kA;t+1   sA;t (17)
= (1 + n) kt+1   A`
1 + `




A (1 + n)
A (1 + `)
k1 t+1 (18)
At the world level, the ows of capital between two countries must necessarily oset each
other:
MAB +MBA = 0 (19)
4 Numerical examples.
To better grasp the sensitivity of the solutions to changes in policy parameters  and 
as well as to changes in demographic parameters, fertility n and longevity `, we resort to
numerical simulations. In these simulations, we use the same specication as above with:
yt = Ak

t where A = 50 and  = 1=3. As to preferences,  = 1. The other parameter
values are given in the tables.
We see that in autarky the steady state capital accumulation decreases with fertility,
longevity, PAYG pensions and retirement exibility. The results were already obtained
analytically except for longevity, which has an ambiguous eect for a large .
We then turn to an economic union with perfect capital mobility between two countries,
one with a PAYG and mandatory early retirement and one with exible retirement but
funded pensions. Not surprisingly the overall capital stock will be depressed by the
presence of either PAYG or exible retirement. The direction of capital ow depends
on the relative importance of the PAYG scheme relative to the exibility in the age of
retirement.
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Our primary interest is the welfare of individuals. The main results are that a PAYG
scheme depresses welfare in the steady state and exible retirement has an ambiguous
eect: positive impact because for a given capital stock it provides more resources to the
individual and negative because it induces less saving. Table 1 indicates that, in autarky,
the capital stock per capita at the steady state decreases with n and increases with `. The
rst result was expected; not the second. Table 2 gives the level of welfare at the steady
state for various values of n and `. The results are the same as previously: utility decreases
with n and increases with `. Tables 3 and 4 deal with the case of an economic union with
country A having a PAYG social security with mandatory early age of retirement and
country B having a fully funded pension system with late exible retirement. Here again
k increases with ` and decreases with n. We have the same pattern for the utilities in the
two countries except for certain values of ` approaching 1 when the parameter values of
A and  are high. In these cases, we have that @UA
@n
> 0: In other words, the country with
PAYG and mandatory retirement age sees its welfare increases when n increases.
Table 1: k in autarky with 0  n  0:05, 0:6  `  1,  = 0:005, A = 50 et  = 10
HHHHHHn
l
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.00 18.719 20.419 21.725 22.718 23.463
0.01 18.523 20.220 21.527 22.522 23.271
0.02 18.329 20.024 21.331 22.329 23.082
0.03 18.138 19.830 21.137 22.138 22.895
0.04 17.950 19.638 20.946 21.949 22.710
0.05 17.765 19.450 20.757 21.763 22.527
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Table 2: Utility in autarky with 0  n  0:05, 0:6  `  1,  = 0:005, A = 50 et  = 10
HHHHHHn
l
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0 6.9226 7.3486 7.7623 8.1669 8.5644
0.01 6.9201 7.3464 7.7603 8.1651 8.5628
0.02 6.9176 7.3442 7.7584 8.1633 8.5611
0.03 6.9152 7.3420 7.7564 8.1616 8.5595
0.04 6.9127 7.3398 7.7545 8.1598 8.5579
0.05 6.9103 7.3377 7.7526 8.1581 8.5564
Table 3: k global with 0  n  0:05, 0:6  `  1, B = 0:005, A = 50 et A = 10
HHHHHHn
l
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.00 27.393 30.263 32.603 34.503 36.036
0.01 27.076 29.929 32.261 34.155 35.686
0.02 26.764 29.602 31.923 33.813 35.342
0.03 26.458 29.279 31.591 33.475 35.003
0.04 26.157 28.962 31.264 33.143 34.669
0.05 25.862 28.650 30.942 32.816 34.340













































































































































































































































































































In this paper we have tried to evaluate the economic implications of ageing on the welfare
of economic unions whose member states have dierent social security regimes. We have
chosen a setting in which some countries have a PAYG system along with mandatory
early age of retirement; as to the other members of the union, their social security is fully
funded and retirement totally exible. The interesting nding is that the latter can end
up with less capital accumulation than the former. We have studied the eect of ageing
on the equilibrium values of this economic union. We distinguish two factors of ageing:
increasing longevity and declining fertility rate. Both factors have a stimulating eect on
capital accumulation. It should be noted however that these ndings are only relevant
for the steady-state. Results are likely to be dierent in the short run dynamics. Among
possible extensions, we would like to adopt more general utility and production functions
and to increase the types of countries involved in the tax competition game.
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Dividing by ` the accumulation rule of capital (Equation (7)), we obtain
G = 2A(1 + `)(1 + n)kt+1   2`A2(1  )kt + 2(1 + n)k1 t+1 + (20)
2A2`(1 + `)(1  )k(1+)t+1 + `A2(1  )2k+1t+1 + 2A` = 0
we dierentiate (20) with respect to `, n,  , , kt+1 and kt are
@G
@`
=  2A` 2(1 + n)kt+1   2` 2(1 + n)k1  + 2A2(1  )k1+t+1 (21)
@G
@n
= 2A(1 + `)kt+1 + 2k
1 
t+1 > 0 (22)
@G
@
= 2A` + (1 + n)k1 t+1 > 0 (23)
@G
@
= 2A2`(1 + `)(1  )k1+t+1 + `A2(1  )2k1+t+1 > 0 (24)
@G
@kt+1
= 2A(1 + n)(1 + `) + 2A2`(1 + `)(1  )kt+1+ (25)
A2`(1  )2kt+1 + 2(1  )(1 + n)k t+1 > 0
@G
@kt
=  22A2`(1  )k 1t < 0 (26)



















From the above expressions, we clearly have the following properties at the steady state:
dk
dn
< 0
dk
d
< 0
dk
d
< 0
dk
d`
? 0
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